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Leaders often deviate from group norms or social conventions, sometimes inno-
vating and sometimes engaging in serious transgressions or illegality. We propose
that group members are prone to be more permissive toward both forms of deviance
in the case of ingroup leaders compared to other ingroup members or outgroup
members and leaders. This granting of “deviance credit” is hypothesized to be
underpinned by perceptions of an ingroup leader’s prototypicality of the group
(“accrual”) and belief that occupancy of the role confers a right to be supported
(“conferral”). Analyses of data from four studies demonstrate that both accrual
and conferral (1) mediate evaluations, inclusion and punishment of deviant lead-
ers, and (2) they make independent contributions to deviance credit. Implications
for leadership, marginalization, corruption, innovation, and transformation are
discussed.
Social change arises if and when people are persuaded to embrace an alterna-
tive to the prevailing social reality, a process often spearheaded by group leaders.
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But when and why are leaders given license to deviate from group norms or social
conventions? Some try to promote progressive change, or their election may itself
symbolize such change (e.g., Barack Obama’s election as U.S. president), but
other leaders may have exploitative, self-serving or criminal ambitions. Reckless
leadership of the world banking system leading to the 2008 financial crisis and
corrupt leadership in FIFA illustrate the dangers of such ambitions. Both admirable
and despicable examples of deviant leadership raise the question of why groups
release the usual normative constraints that bind other members.
Group members value conformity to norms, which makes achievement of
collective goals and the subjective validation of social reality possible (Festinger,
1950; Shaw, 1976; Turner, 1991). Consequently, deviants trigger negative reactions
from other members, including derogation and ostracism (see Levine & Kerr, 2007,
for a review). This is especially true when the deviants are ingroup members,
giving rise to the “black sheep effect” (Marques & Pa´ez, 1994), in which ingroup
deviants are judged more harshly than comparable outgroup deviants. However,
groups frequently face challenges that require them to innovate or adapt to novel
circumstances (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008; Barone
& Jewell, 2013; Levine & Marques, 2016), and leaders are required to direct or
defend such innovative strategies.
We contend that both innovation and transgression by leaders may be en-
abled through psychological processes that create “deviance credit,” which refers
to group members’ willingness to forego the obligations and social contracts of
group membership and to give ingroup leaders the autonomy to diverge from
group norms. We do not assume that ingroup leaders are completely free to
deviate; they merely meet less resistance than do deviant nonleaders. In this
article, we summarize previously published evidence for deviance credit and
present new evidence for two hypothesized underlying processes–accrual and
conferral.
Subjective Group Dynamics Theory and Leadership
Our account is rooted in subjective group dynamics theory (Marques, Paez,
& Abrams, 1998), which assumes that individuals respond toward each other
based on their ingroup/outgroup membership, their within-group status, and their
conformity to salient prescriptive norms (Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-
Taboada, 1998; Pinto, Marques, Levine, & Abrams, 2010, 2016; Travaglino,
Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Pinto, 2014). According to the theory,
individuals have a basic need to confirm the subjective validity of norms which
legitimate their ingroup membership as a source of positive social identity (Mar-
ques & Pa´ez, 1994; cf. Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Hence, group members are vigilant
regarding whether other members contribute positively or negatively to ingroup
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positive distinctiveness by conforming to or by violating such norms (Marques
et al., 1998). By derogating ingroup deviant members, and endorsing ingroup
normative members, individuals subjectively validate the ingroup’s positive
value.
Status, Leadership and Reactions to Deviance
The severity of responses elicited by deviant ingroup members depends on
their centrality in the group. For example, Pinto et al. (2010, Experiment 3) found
that negative evaluations of deviants who are new ingroup members (those with
probationary status in the group; see Levine & Moreland, 1994) were associated
with socialization strategies, whereas negative evaluations of deviants who are full
ingroup members (who have maximum rights and responsibilities in the group)
were associated with punishment strategies (see also Pinto, Marques, Levine, &
Abrams, 2016). In the context of leadership, however, two theoretical perspectives–
idiosyncrasy credit and social identity theory–suggest that groups may allow
leaders (who typically are ingroup full members) enhanced rather than reduced
license to deviate compared to the license given to nonleaders (Coser, 1962).
Idiosyncrasy credit and leadership. Hollander (1958) proposed that lead-
ers gain trust from their followers based on their positive contributions to the
group over time. Although idiosyncrasy credit has no clear operational definition
(Yukl, 2006), it has been viewed as arising from leaders’ displays of knowledge,
intelligence, competence, conformity to group norms, group loyalty, and group-
oriented motivation (Hackman, 1992; Winkler, 2010). According to Hollander
(2006), once sufficient idiosyncrasy credits have been accumulated, a leader is
permitted to introduce nonconformist actions–innovation–consistent with his or
her leadership role and contribute to group welfare (Hollander, 2006). Curiously,
the theory makes no predictions regarding intergroup contexts and does not con-
sider when a leader’s actions might harm the group (see Abrams et al., 2008;
Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Travaglino, 2013).
Social identity and leadership. The social identity perspective (e.g.,
Haslam, 2001; Hogg, 2001) proposes that leadership emerges to the extent a
member is seen to embody the group prototype–those features that differentiate
the ingroup from relevant outgroups. More prototypical ingroup leaders better
represent the group’s identity and are evaluated more positively (see Hains, Hogg,
& Duck, 1997; Haslam & Platow, 2001).
Central members who deviate receive harsher social evaluations than more
peripheral deviants (cf. Pinto et al., 2010). Therefore, it might be assumed that
ingroup leaders who deviate from prescriptive ingroup norms are perceived to vio-
late expectations very strongly. Therefore, they might be valuated more negatively
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than comparably deviant ingroup members. However, because group prototypes
are malleable depending on the circumstances (Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011)
and because leaders are regarded as exemplifying the group prototype sine pare,
group members’ only option may be to give their leader opportunities to flex their
normative muscles and behave in non-normative ways (cf. Pinto et al., 2016).
Prior Work on Leaders’ Innovation Credit and Transgression Credit
Abrams et al. (2008) conducted seven experiments demonstrating the award
of “innovation credit” to leaders. Students judged either psychologists (ingroup
members) or customs and immigration officers (outgroup members) whose at-
titudes toward asylum policies were either normative, pro-normative (extreme)
or anti-normative (deviating towards the opposing group’s norm). They also var-
ied whether the deviants were members or leaders and whether the leaders were
established (current) leaders, ex-leaders, or incoming (future) leaders. These stud-
ies revealed that ingroup deviant future leaders were evaluated more positively,
granted more freedom to innovate and rewarded more than other deviants.
More recently, in nine studies, Abrams et al. (2013) investigated reactions to
group members who transgressed (acted illegally or act that broke rules binding
both the ingroup and the outgroup). In one paradigm, a player or the captain of
participants’ own or rivals sports teams transgressed by shouting and swearing
at the referee following a decision that risked the ingroup’s outcomes. In another
paradigm, minimal groups were used and the leader cheated to win a competi-
tion for the group. Other parallel studies involved scenarios in which university
committees or regional representatives proposed bribery or blackmail in order to
achieve a desired outcome (Randsley de Moura & Abrams, 2013). Across these
studies, we found that transgressive ingroup leaders were evaluated and punished
less harshly than identically transgressive ingroup members or outgroup leaders or
members. We also established various boundary conditions for this “transgression
credit,” namely that the leader must be seen to want to serve the group’s interests
(cf. Packer, Miners, & Ungson, 2018), not to cross significant moral boundaries,
such as expressing racist sentiment (Abrams, Travaglino, Randsley de Moura, &
May, 2015; cf. Brescoll, Okimoto, & Vial, 2018), and to be part of a relatively
small group (Travaglino, Abrams, Randsley de Moura, & Yetkili, 2016; cf. Martin,
Thomas, Hewstone, & Gardikiotis, 2018).
The Accrual and Conferral Hypotheses
Abrams et al. (2008) drew on Fielding and Hogg’s (1997) social identity
analysis of leader prototypicality to propose two mechanisms involved in innova-
tion credit, which we believe also apply to transgression credit (see also Randsley
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de Moura, Abrams, Marques, & Hutchison, 2011). The first is prototypicality
accrual–the extent to which leaders are perceived as having accrued, or gained,
greater prototypicality than other group members. Group members may reasonably
assume that an incumbent or elected leader provides a good representation of the
group prototype and may resist imagining that their leader does not do so. Indeed,
to view a leader as nonprototypical would imply a negative evaluation of the group
as a whole, which risks imperiling positive social identity.
The second mechanism is conferral–group members’ willingness to concede
that the right to be supported as leader is invested in the leadership role itself. We
expect that, owing to attributional biases and heuristics, people are also likely to
infer that mere occupancy of the leadership role (i.e., regardless of whether the
leader has been designated or elected, or even was self-appointed) means that the
leader is likely to have greater expertise or commitment to the group than do other
members. Moreover, even without full information about the leader’s prototypi-
cality, members may draw on leadership stereotypes to assume that the leader is
somehow more knowledgeable or charismatic or strong than other members (Lord
& Hall, 2003), and perhaps more prototypical too. Consequently, in a form of
anticipated idiosyncrasy credit, members are willing to support the leader to make
decisions on the group’s behalf.
Empirical Evidence
To date, the roles of accrual and conferral processes in transgression credit
have not been demonstrated empirically. In this article, we present data that were
collected as part of our studies on transgression credit (Abrams et al., 2013,
2015) but were not published earlier due to journal editorial preferences and space
limitations. Because the original studies were reported in detail, the present article
provides only a summary of their methodology and findings, focusing instead
on new analyses examining mediational processes. These data provide important
evidence relevant to our theory and have implications for application and practice.
Study 1
Design, measures and hypotheses. In Abrams et al. (2013, Experiment 2),
81 university students who belonged to a range of sports associations at the
University of Kent (e.g., Netball, Soccer, Rugby) read a description of an incident
just before the end of a highly competitive game. Two players (the captain and
a player, either from the ingroup or outgroup team) were frustrated by an event
on the field. One of the targets (either the captain or a player) became irate
and transgressed the rules of the game by arguing vehemently with the referee
and acting offensively toward opposing players (deviant target). The other target
remained calm and polite and obeyed the referee’s instructions (normative target).
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The design was a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Role of transgressor:
captain vs. player) x 2 (Target: transgressive, normative) mixed factorial design
with repeated measures on the Target factor. Responses to dependent measures
were recorded using 7 point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely)
Participants’ ratings of how friendly, likeable, warm, and approachable each
target was, were averaged on an evaluation score for each target (αs = .97). In
addition, participants’ ratings of how strongly each target represented his team and
how much his actions reflected the overall feelings of the team (r = .60, p < .001)
were averaged to create a prototypicality accrual score for each target.
The accrual hypothesis predicts that evaluations of the targets should be
associated with accrual and hence there should be significant Group x Role x
Target interaction on both accrual and evaluations. Centrally, transgression credit,
expressed through relatively positive evaluations of transgressive ingroup leaders
should be at least partially explained (mediated) by leaders’ accrual of ingroup-
prototypicality.
Results. We performed a Group x Role x Target ANOVA on the dependent
variables with repeated measures on the Target factor. The significant main effects
and the three way interaction on evaluations reported in Abrams et al. (2013), were
matched by a similar interaction on accrual (see Table 1 for means and standard
errors). Specifically, the main effects of Group, F(1, 77) = 15.47, p < .001,
η2 = .17, Target, F(1, 77) = 22.21, p < .001, η2 < .22, and Role, F(1, 77) = 5.41,
p = .023, η2 = .07 were all significant. Captains’ accrual was judged to be higher
(M = 4.51, SE = .13) than was players’ (M = 4.10, SE = 0.12). The significant
Group x Role interaction, F(1, 77) = 4.98, p = .029, η2 = .06, and Role x Target
interaction, F(1, 77) = 5.60, p = .020, η2 = .07 were qualified by a significant
Group x Role x Target interaction, F(1, 77) = 4.58, p = .036, η2 = .06.
As shown in Table 1, consistent with an accrual process for transgres-
sion credit, simple effects tests confirmed that the transgressive ingroup cap-
tain had higher accrual than the transgressive ingroup player, F(1, 77) = 17.04,
p < .001, η2 = .18,or the transgressive outgroup captain, F(1, 77) = 17.33, p <
.001, η2 = .18. Moreover, accrual for transgressive versus normative (M = 4.97,
SE = 0.28) ingroup captains did not differ significantly, F(1, 77) = 0.163, p = .168,
η2 < .01.
Transgression credit should apply only to ingroup targets. Therefore, accrual
should mediate the effect of Role on evaluations of transgressors targets in the
Ingroup but not in the Outgroup condition and in the Captain, but not in the Player
condition. To test this idea we conducted a mediated moderation test using Hayes’
(2012) PROCESS macro (Model 7, 5000 bootstrap samples). In reporting this
and all subsequent analyses using PROCESS we report unstandardized regression
coefficients.
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Table 1. Means and Standard Errors (in Parentheses) for Measures across Studies 1 to 4
Ingroup Outgroup
Study Measure Group Role Leader (SE) Member (SE) Leader (SE) Member (SE)
1 (CP) Evaluation Transgressor 4.68 (.25) 3.62 (.25) 2.35 (.24) 2.36 (.23)
Normative 5.18 (.27) 4.74 (.27) 4.96 (.26) 4.15 (.24)
Accrual Transgressor 5.16 (.31) 3.34 (.31) 3.35 (.30) 3.28 (.28)
Normative 4.97 (.28) 5.16 (.28) 4.58 (.27) 4.61 (.25)
2 (LM) Evaluation Transgressor 5.40 (.33) 4.21 (.32) 4.13 (.33) 4.65 (.32)
Normative 5.35 (.22) 5.15 (.23) 5.23 (.22) 4.83 (.23)
Punitiveness Transgressor 22.67 (6.78) 2.44 (6.78) −6.59 (6.98) 7.10 (6.60)
Normative 31.28 (3.59) 22.28 (3.59) 32.89 (3.49) 21.41 (3.69)
Conferral Transgressor 5.39 (.42) 3.63 (.41) 3.19 (.45) 4.32 (.41)
Normative 5.52 (.28) 5.06 (.29) 5.47 (.28) 5.38 (.31)
3 (CP) Evaluation Transgressor 4.66 (.25) 2.49 (.22)
Normative 5.26 (.20) 5.38 (.18)
Inclusion Transgressor 5.16 (.32) 3.50 (.29)
Normative 5.84 (.24) 5.91 (.21)
Punishment Transgressor 12400 (1109) 9194 (996)
Normative 20806 17600
Accrual Transgressor 3.98 (.33) 2.41 (.29)
Normative 6.04 (.19) 5.81 (.17)
Conferral Transgressor 4.20 (.33) 3.47 (.29)
Normative 4.80 (.36) 5.06 (.31)
4 (C) Evaluation Racial 2.13 (.84) 2.01 (.53)
Nonracial 4.75 (.85) 2.45 (1.09)
Accrual Racial 2.96 (1.38) 3.51 (1.57)
Nonracial 5.48 (1.34) 4.13 (1.49)
Conferral Racial 1.62 (.85) 2.27 (1.60)
Nonracial 5.52 (1.33) 3.07 (1.15)
Note. C = Captain P = Player, L = Leader, M = Member. All measures are scored on a scale from
1 = not at all/lowest to 7 = very much/highest, except punishment/punitiveness. In Study 2 punitiveness
was scored from −50 to +50 in steps of 10. In Study 3, where punishment is scored from 0 to 30,000 in
steps of 5000. Punitiveness to the transgressor in one role is interdependent with the normative target
in the other. Due to this interdependence, standard errors are only provided for transgressors.
For normative targets, accrual and evaluations were positively related,
b = 0.37, SE = 0.10, t = 3.54, p < .001, but there were no significant inter-
active effects of Role and Group on accrual, b = -.15, t = 0.28, p = .78, ruling
out the possibility of mediated moderation. For evaluations of transgressors (see
Figure 1), Group, Role and accrual together accounted for 52% of the variance,
F(1, 76) = 20.14, p < .001. We tested whether the interactive effect of Group
and Role on transgressor accrual mediated their interactive effect on transgressor
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Group (Ingroup =1 
vs. Outgroup = 2)
Role (Captain = 
1 vs. Player = 2)
Group x Role
Evaluation
Accrual-.90**
-.89**
-1.75**
.45***
-1.54***
-.14
.62
Fig. 1. Study 1: Mediated moderation model showing coefficients for the indirect effect of group and
role on evaluation of the transgressive target via accrual.
Note. Independent variables are centered. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
evaluations. The effect of accrual, b = 0.26, SE = 0.09, t = 3.01, p = .004, as well
as the direct effect of Group, b = −1.54, t = 3.36, p < .001, significantly pre-
dicted evaluation. However, the direct effects of Role and of the Group x Role on
evaluation were nonsignificant, bs = −0.26, 0.62, SE = 0.24, 0.48, t = −1.09,
1.28, p = .28, .20, respectively, indicating that the Group x Role effect on evalua-
tions was fully mediated by accrual.
To test whether the mediation was indeed focused on ingroup captains we
inspected the conditional indirect effect of Group within each level of Role (captain
or player). The conditional indirect effect of Group was significant for the captain,
b = −0.57, SE = 0.23, 95% CI (−1.11, −0.20), but not the player, b = −.02,
SE = .16, 95% CI (−0.34, 0.30). We also examined conditional effects of Role
within each level of Group. The conditional indirect effect of Role was significant
in the ingroup condition, b = −0.83, SE = 0.27, 95% CI (−1.49, −0.40), but not
the outgroup condition, b = −0.03, SE = 0.20, 95% CI (−0.43, 0.37).
In summary, only when the transgressor was a captain did accrual mediate
the effect of Group on evaluations of the transgressor, and only when participants
judged ingroup members did accrual mediate the effect of Role on evaluations
of the transgressor. Thus, the transgression credit which is uniquely granted to
the ingroup transgressive captains is reflected in perceptions that this person
is more prototypical of the team than is the transgressive ingroup player. This
finding is consistent with the idea that accrual may explain why participants judge
transgressive ingroup leaders more leniently.
Study 2
Design measures and hypotheses. The second study (Abrams et al., 2013,
Experiment 3) used the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament,
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1971) to test the idea that transgression credit is spontaneously generated in
subjective group dynamics. This study also enabled us to test the distinctive role
of conferral without any potential confound with accrual. Specifically, we assigned
the leadership role randomly, thereby ensuring that participants could not infer
prototypicality from prior evidence about the leader. The transgressive act involved
cheating on a group task, and we observed transgression credit in the evaluations
and punishments given to the ingroup leader.
Seventy-five Mechanical Turk workers were categorized as exhibiting either
deductive or inductive thinking on the basis of a (bogus) cognitive test. Next,
they observed a prerecorded chat room interaction among either four ingroup or
outgroup members and were informed that there was a randomly appointed leader
for a logic puzzle task. During the interaction, either the leader or a member
cheated by using the internet to find the solution. The design was a 2 (Group:
ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Role of the Transgressor: leader vs. member) x 2
(Target: transgressive, normative) mixed factorial design with repeated measures
on the Target factor.
Participants rated how likeable, warm, and nice each target was, using seven-
point scales (1 = not at all, 7 = completely), and these ratings were averaged
on evaluation measures for both the leader (α = .90) and the member (α = .87).
Participants’ expressed punitiveness by indicating how much the targets should
be punished versus rewarded for their actions, using a slider from −50 (punished)
to +50 (rewarded). Finally, we measured conferral by asking participants to indi-
cate how much the [target] “should be supported by the [target’s] group” (1 = not
at all, 7 = completely). We predicted that participants would apply conferral only
to ingroup leaders. Therefore, in the present analysis we test whether the inter-
active effect of Group and Role on evaluations and punitiveness is mediated by
conferral.
Results. On both Target x Role x Group interactions on the evaluation and
the punitiveness measures (Abrams et al., 2013), the transgressive ingroup leader
received more favorable responses than the remaining targets. For conferral, there
was a significant main effect of Target, F(1, 68) = 19.67, p < .001, η2 = .22. Nor-
mative targets were perceived to deserve more support (M = 5.36, SE = 0.15) than
transgressive targets (M = 4.13, SE = 0.21), but this was qualified by a significant
Target x Role x Group interaction, F(1, 68) = 8.67, p < .01, η2 = .11 (Table 1).
No other effects were significant, Fs < 2.60. Simple effects tests revealed more
conferral of support for the transgressive ingroup leader (M = 5.39, SE = 0.42)
than the transgressive ingroup member (M = 3.63, SE = 0.41), F(1, 68) = 8.93,
p < .01, η2 = .12. Conferral for the ingroup transgressive leader was larger than
for the outgroup transgressive leader, F(1, 68) = 12.85, p = .001, η2 = .16. No
other simple effects were significant.
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Group (Ingroup = 
1 vs. Outgroup = 
2) 
Role (Leader = 1 
vs. Member = 2) 
Group x Role  
Evaluation 
Conferral -4.87*** 
-4.53** 
2.78** 
.45*** 
-1.07 
-1.01  
-60 
Fig. 2. Study 2: Mediated moderation model showing coefficients for the indirect effect of group and
role on evaluation via conferral.
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
We predicted that the mediating role of conferral for transgressors would
apply to evaluations only of ingroup leaders. Consistent with this prediction, the
conditional indirect effect of Group was significant for the leader, b = −0.94,
SE = 0.31, 95% CI (−1.72, −0.45), but not for the member b = 0.30, SE = 0.26,
95% CI (−0.16, 0.89). Moreover, the conditional indirect effect of Role on
evaluations was significant within the ingroup condition, b = −0.78, SE = 0.25,
95% CI (−1.41, −0.37) but not the outgroup condition, b = 0.19, SE = 0.38, 95%
CI (−0.08, 1.10). Therefore, conferral only accounted for the evaluations of the
ingroup leader (see Figure 2).
A parallel mediated moderation analysis with punitiveness as the dependent
variable revealed similar effects (not displayed owing to space limitations). Tests
of conditional indirect effects revealed that these were only significant for the
leader within Group, b = −24.57, SE = 8.03, 95% CI (−41.19, −9.96), and for
ingroup within Role, b = −20.20, SE = 7.01, 95% CI (−35.06, −7.26).
Discussion of study 1 and study 2. In Study 1 accrual (perceived proto-
typicality) mediated the effects of a transgressive leader’s group membership on
evaluations of that leader in a sports context. That is, accrued prototypicality asso-
ciated with ingroup leaders inhibited derogation when that leader deviated. Study
2 revealed that even when the roles of group members had been determined ex-
plicitly randomly, precluding the possibility of accrual, transgression credit to the
(minimal) ingroup transgressive leader was associated with the conferral process.
That is, responses to the transgressive ingroup leader were associated with mem-
bers’ beliefs that the leader’s role required that the leader should be supported.
Importantly, conferral also seems to protect the transgressive ingroup leader from
punishment.
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Study 3
Design, measures and hypotheses. Study 3 (from Abrams et al., 2013, Ex-
periment 4) investigates the potential mediating roles of both accrual and conferral
in willingness to retain (include) versus exclude and to reward/punish ingroup
transgressive leaders. Financial punishment is a penalty from which a deviant
may recover, and which is routinely imposed on transgressive individuals only
by authorities (e.g., governing bodies). In contrast, exclusion may be inflicted by
any group member and has potentially serious psychological consequences for
an individual’s future opportunities and prospects (Abrams & Christian, 2007;
Kerr & Levine, 2008; Williams, 2007). Moreover, exclusion of a leader implies
rejection of that leader’s prototypicality and is an informative index of member’s
willingness to nullify the target’s membership.
The procedure in Study 3 matched that of Study 1, except that only ingroup
targets were presented. The design was a 2 (Role of transgressor: Captain vs.
Player) x 2 (Target: Normative, Transgressive), with Target as a within-participants
factor. Fifty eight university students completed the evaluation measures as in
Study 1. Inclusion was measured by asking participants how much the target
should be included in the team in the future (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
Punitiveness was measured by having participants allocate a £30,000 bonus (if
their team won) between the captain and the player (using steps of £5000). Accrual
was measured by asking participants to indicate the extent to which the target was
“good for the image” of their team, and “represented their team well” (1 = not at
all, 7 = very much). The two items (r = .84 for transgressive targets and r = .68
for normative targets) were averaged to create a composite score for each target.
Conferral was measured by asking participants to what extent, during a game,
they thought they “should support [target’s] decisions whatever they are” (1 = not
at all, 7 = very much).
Results. Role x Target ANOVAs revealed significant interactions for eval-
uations, inclusion and punitiveness (see Abrams et al., 2013). The transgressive
captain received significantly more favorable responses than the transgressive
player.
For accrual, significant main effects of Target, F(1, 55) = 101.00, p < .001,
η2 = .65, and Role, F(1, 55) = 5.07, p < .001, η2 = .22, were qualified by a
significant Role x Target interaction, F(1, 55) = 6.13, p = .016, η2 = .10. Simple
effects tests revealed a significant effect of Role for the transgressive targets, F(1,
55) = 12.88, p < .001, η2 = .19 (captain M = 3.98, SE = 0.33, player M = 2.41
SE = 0.29), but not for the normative targets, F(1, 55) = 0.82, p = .37, η2 = .02
(captain M = 6.04, SE = 0.19; player M = 5.81, SE = 0.17).
For conferral, the main effect of Role was nonsignificant, F(1, 55) = 0.33,
p < .568, η2 < .01, and the effect of Target, F(1, 55) = 27.78, p < .001, η2 = .34,
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Role (1 = Captain, 
2 = Player) 
Accrual
Conferral 
Inclusion 
-1.62*** 
-.81+ 
-1.64*** (-.62+) 
.34*** 
.47*** 
Fig. 3. Study 3: Mediation of the effect of transgressor role on inclusion through accrual and conferral.
Note. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
was qualified by a significant Role x Target interaction, F(1, 55) = 5.70, p = .02,
η2 = .09. Conferral was lower for transgressive than for normative players
(M = 3.47, 5.06, SE = 0.29, 0.31, respectively), F(1, 55) = 33.43, p < .001,
η2 = .38, whereas conferral was similarly high for transgressive and normative
captains (M = 4.20, 4.80, SE = 0.33, 0.36, respectively), F(1, 55) = 3.70, p = .06,
η2 = 06.
We tested whether accrual and conferral mediated effects of Role on eval-
uations, inclusion, and punitiveness towards the transgressors. As hypothesized,
both potential mediators were significantly correlated with the three dependent
variables (all rs > .28, p < .05), as well as with each other (r = .32, p = .015).
We conducted three multiple mediation analyses (Hayes, 2012, Model 4,
5000 bootstraps), considering Role as the predictor, accrual and conferral as the
mediators, and evaluations, punitiveness and inclusion (shown in Figure 3 for il-
lustrative purposes) as the dependent variables. Role affected accrual significantly,
b = −1.62, t = 3.72, p < .001, but conferral only marginally, b = −0.81, t = 1.82,
p = .074.
For evaluations, the role of transgressor (captain or player) and the mediators
together accounted for 52% of the variance, F(3, 54) = 19.87, p < .001. There
was a significant total effect of Role, b = −2.22, t = 6.70, p < .001, and a
significant direct effect of Role, b = −1.74, t = 4.95, p < .001, on evaluations.
Accrual affected evaluations directly (b = 0.26, t = 2.64, p = .011) but conferral
did not (b = 0.07, t = 0.76, p = .453). Importantly, the total indirect effect of
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Role through accrual and conferral was also significant, b = −0.48, Z = 2.41,
p = .016, 95% CI (−1.06, −0.10). The specific indirect effects were significant
via accrual, b = −0.42, SE = 0.22, 95% CI (−0.96, −0.07) but not conferral,
b = −0.06, SE = 0.00, 95% CI (−0.34, 0.04). This shows that accrual partially
mediated between role and evaluations, consistent with the results from Study 1.
For inclusion of the transgressor (see Figure 3), role and the mediators together
accounted for 56% of the variance, F(3, 54) = 22.51, p < .001. There was a
significant total effect of Role, b = −1.64, t = 3.87, p < .001, whereas the
direct effect of Role was nonsignificant, b = −0.62, t = 1.69, p = .097, 95%
CI (−1.35, 0.12). Both accrual and conferral affected inclusion directly, bs = 0.47,
.34, ts = 4.53, 3.37, ps < .001, = .001, respectively). Importantly, the total indirect
effect of Role via accrual and conferral was also significant, b = −1.03, Z = 3.20,
p = .001, 95% CI (−1.61, −0.53). There was a significant separate indirect effect
through accrual, b = −0.75, SE = 0.24, 95% CI (−1.31, −0.35). The indirect
effect of Role through conferral was also significant b = −0.27, SE = 0.18, 95%
CI (−0.77, −0.02). In summary, accrual and conferral independently and fully
mediated between Role and inclusion.
For punitiveness, bonus allocation to the transgressor was scaled to the
same metric (1–7) as the mediators (cf. Preacher & Hayes, 2004). Role and
the mediators together accounted for 31% of the variance in punitiveness, F(3,
52) = 7.91, p < .001. There was a significant total effect of Role, b = −0.64, t =
2.15, p = .036, whereas the direct effect of Role was nonsignificant, b = −0.15,
t = 0.48, p = .632. Both accrual and conferral affected punitiveness, bs = 0.22,
0.21, ts = 2.68, 2.55, ps = .010, .014, respectively). The total indirect effect of
Role via accrual and conferral was also significant, b = −0.51, Z = 2.57, p = .01,
95% CI (−0.92, −0.18). There was a significant separate indirect effect of accrual,
b = −0.34, Z = 2.17, p = .030, 95% CI (−0.76, −0.09), but not by conferral,
b = −0.16, Z = 1.42, p = .156, 95% CI (−0.44, 0.01). This pattern of findings
shows that accrual fully mediated between Role and punitiveness.
In sum, accrual (representativeness) mediated between Role and inclusion,
evaluation and punitiveness, while conferral (support) mediated between Role and
inclusion. Moreover these two mediators fully accounted for the effects of Role
on both inclusion and punitiveness.
Study 4
Design, measures and hypotheses. Study 4 provides a further test of the
joint roles of accrual and conferral in the context of a boundary condition for
transgression credit. This study (see Abrams et al., 2015, for details) adapted the
sports transgression paradigm from Studies 1 and 3 with a moral twist in which
half of the participants judged a transgression that included a racist aside, “why
don’t you go back to your own country?.” All targets were leaders, either from the
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ingroup or outgroup team. Transgression credit in evaluations disappeared when
the ingroup transgressive captain additionally showed racist intent.
Here we examine unexplored subset of data that measured participants’ con-
ferral and accrual judgments of captains. We expected that accrual and conferral
would be affected by the captain’s group membership and form of transgression.
We also expected that accrual and conferral would mediate the effect of conditions
on evaluations of the captain.
Sixty undergraduate students at the University of Kent thought about the
captain of their soccer team or their main rival soccer team and then read a
scenario involving a crucial game in which winning was essential. The design was
a 2 (Group: ingroup vs. outgroup) x 2 (Type of Transgression: nonracist vs. racist)
full between-participants.
Participants were told that the (ingroup or outgroup) captain clashed with an
opposing player and then “advanced aggressively against the opposing player and,
while the referee was distant, shouted at the opposing player.” In the Nonracism
condition, the transgressor shouted: “you idiot, watch yourself and go to hell.” In
the Racism condition this was modified to, “You idiot, watch yourself and go the
hell back to your country.” Finally, the transgressor was described as refusing to
engage in the customary handshake with opposing team players at the end of the
game.
Evaluation was similar to the previous studies (α = .95). To measure ac-
crual, participants rated (1 = not at all, 7 = completely) the extent to which the
transgressor “has the characteristics and qualities that are highly shared by all
members of your team and most distinctive and different from the other team,” “is
representative of your team,” and “typical of your team” (α = .89). To measure
conferral, participants rated (1 = not at all, 7 = extremely) the extent to which
the transgressor was “entitled to behave as he did,” “should be supported by the
team,” “has a role that allows that behavior,” and “behaves as you would expect a
leader of this team to behave” (α = .93).
Results. ANOVAs revealed significant Group x Type of Transgression
interactions on evaluations, and on both accrual, F(1, 54) = 5.48, p = .023,
ηp
2 = .092, and conferral, F(1,54) = 21.37, p < .001, ηp2 = .284 (see Table 1).
Simple effects analyses revealed that evaluations, accrual, and conferral, respec-
tively, were all significantly lower for the racist captain than the nonracist captain
in the ingroup condition (Fs 1,54  19.93, ps < .001) but not in the outgroup
condition (Fs 2.67, lowest p > .1), and higher for the ingroup than the outgroup
captain when the transgression was nonracial (Fs  5.17, ps  .001, <.05, <
.001,) but not when it was racial (Fs  2.09, lowest p > .15).
Conferral and accrual were related (r = .66, p < .001). We tested how they
separately mediated the effect of the interaction on evaluations using PROCESS
Model 7, 5000 bootstraps. The model, shown in Figure 4, accounted for 55% of the
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Group (Ingroup = 1 
vs. Outgroup = 2)
Type of Transgression
(Racist = 1 vs Non  
Racist =2)
Group x Type
EvaluationConferral2.35***
-.90**
.30**
[In 1.15*, Out .24]
Accrual
.23* [In: .55*, Out .14]
3.10***
-1.8*
-.34
1.52***
1.05*** (.49) 
Fig. 4. Study 4: Mediated moderation model showing coefficients for the indirect effect of group, type
of transgression and their interaction on evaluation via accrual and conferral.
Note. Independent variables are centered. *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. Direct effect is in round
brackets, conditional effects are in square brackets.
variance in evaluations, F(3, 56) = 22.94, p < .001). There were significant effects
overall for both accrual, b = 0.23, SE = 0.10, t = 2.28, p = .03, and conferral,
b = 0.30, SE = 0.10, t = 3.03, p = .004. The conditional indirect effect of type
of transgression remained significant in the ingroup condition for both accrual,
b = 0.55, SE = 0.32, 95% CI (0.06,1.32), and conferral, b = 1.15, SE = 0.55, 95%
CI (0.18, 2.31), whereas in the outgroup condition the conditional indirect effects
of type of transgression were nonsignificant via both accrual, b = 0.14, SE = 0.21,
95% CI(−0.05, 0.60) for accrual and conferral b = 0.24, SE = 0.21, 95% CI(−0.04,
0.78). Moreover, the direct effect of type of transgression was nonsignificant when
the mediators were included in the model, b = 0.49, SE = 0.32, t = 1.54, p = .13.
Finally, the direct effect of the interaction on evaluation, b = −2.17, SE = 0.44,
t = 4.94, p < .001, decreased when accrual and construal were included as
mediators, b = −1.59, SE = 0.48, t = 3.35, p = .002. In summary, both accrual
and conferral mediated the interactive effect of the captain’s group membership
and type of transgression on evaluations.
General Discussion
The social identity approach to leadership emphasizes that leaders emerge
and survive to the extent that they embody the group’s norm. Members who have
the highest representativeness (prototypicality) are most valued as leaders (Hogg,
2001). Our deviance credit hypothesis proposes that ingroup leaders benefit from
both accrual of prototypicality and conferral of the right to depart from existing
norms, or to orient to new norms. Studies 1, 3, and 4 demonstrated that accrued
prototypicality mediated effects on evaluation of transgressors, and (in Study 3) on
the extent to which they are included or punished. Studies 2, 3 and 4 demonstrated
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that deviant leaders can benefit from a conferral process–the belief that ingroup
leaders should be supported by their members. Study 2 revealed that conferral
even affected evaluation and punitiveness to a randomly appointed leader in an
entirely novel and minimal group. Studies 3 and 4 also supported the theoretical
proposition that accrual and conferral can independently and jointly contribute to
deviance credit.
Theoretical Contribution, Limitations and Implications for Policy and Research
Previous theory suggests that deviance and innovation are permitted or ef-
fective when (1) the deviant has built up sufficient idiosyncrasy credit within the
group (Hollander, 1958) or (2) the deviant can demonstrate strong motivation to
help or enhance the group (Abrams et al., 2013). Moreover, previous theory and
research indicated that leaders can act as entrepreneurs of identity and new group
norms (Reicher, Haslam, & Hopkins, 2005). The present research extends that
work by drawing on subjective group dynamics theory to address why particu-
lar group members have scope both to innovate and to transgress. In particular,
we highlighted how two processes, the accrual of prototypicality and conferral
of the right to lead, independently and jointly can explain why ingroup leaders
are granted deviance credit. We acknowledge that the present evidence focuses
entirely on transgression credit. More research is needed to test whether accrual
and conferral also mediate innovation credit (Abrams et al., 2008). Indeed, we
do not assume that innovation and transgression are necessarily orthogonal; some
transgressions may be highly innovative, and some innovations may be quite trans-
gressive. The distinction may be partly in the eye of the beholder. However, we
believe our evidence is consistent with a general process of deviance credit that
can facilitate leaders’ innovation as well as transgression.
Further research is also needed to consider how best to measure conferral.
Studies 2 and 3 used a single item measure, and Study 4 showed that this item
converges well with two others to form a reliable scale. However, the scope and
distinctiveness of this construct warrants further exploration, as do the situational
factors that may limit or accentuate conferral.
Relatively unconstrained by their group, leaders may be prone to extreme
and contrary actions, taking advantage of deviance credit. Recent decisions by
political leaders spring to mind, for example, Donald Trump’s first 100 days have
been marked by completely unexpected decisions, such as dropping a Massive
Ordnance Airblast Bomb (MOAB) bomb on Syria on April 13th 2017. On April
18th 2017, the U.K.’s new Prime Minister, Theresa May, announced that she was
calling an immediate general election, despite having promised not to do so less
than a month earlier. Her justification was her wish to bolster her mandate to
pursue Brexit—a policy which she had opposed prior to the U.K. Referendum on
EU membership.
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Deviance credit clearly has limits, as revealed by Abrams et al. (2015), and we
expect that most forms of leader deviance begin in moderate forms which progress
to extremes if left unchecked. Thus, deviance credit plays a role in enabling
both positive and negative social change. Archival evidence may prove useful in
tracking these progressions. Deviance credit may also have unexpected negative
effects for a group. If group members do not limit transgressive leadership, the
group may become increasingly vulnerable to criticism and attack from observers
and outgroups. These effects may exacerbate intergroup tension and conflict,
particularly if an extremist leader is viewed by outsiders as prototypical of that
group (cf. Hogg & Blaylock, 2012). Likewise, innovation credit might ironically
reduce group members’ appreciation of their leaders’ creativity, making the group
vulnerable to poaching of its leader by other groups. Importantly, however, we do
not believe that deviance credit is an inherent benefit of leadership per se. Rather, as
emphasized by subjective group dynamics theory, the intergroup context strongly
frames which leaders are granted deviance credit, and by whom.
Future research should investigate cultural effects on deviance credit. For
example, collectivist communities might be reluctant to derogate deviant ingroup
leaders but might place tight constraints to prevent them from breaching rules in
the first place (Blair & Bligh, 2018). The social developmental antecedents of
deviance credit also deserve to be explored. Young children’s reliance on morality
based reasoning (right vs. wrong, fair vs. unfair) might prevent deviance credit,
whereas adolescents may accept ingroup leaders’ deviance and justify it in terms
of the importance of preserving group functioning (Abrams, Rutland, Pelletier, &
Ferrell, 2009).
Accrual, conferral, and deviance credit have implications for the way teams,
organizations, and countries respond to leaders’ creative and innovative behavior,
as well as to their illegal and corrupt behavior (Ashforth & Anand, 2003; Near &
Miceli, 2011; Van de Vyver, Travaglino, Vasiljevic, & Abrams, 2015). Deviance
credit may be a decisive enabler for leaders to generate constructive social change,
but also to establish destructive, extremist and morally questionable norms in the
name of the group. Understanding both the opportunities and risks arising from
deviance credit therefore presents an important challenge for research, policy and
practice.
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